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Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating
Juveniles in Adult Jails
KEISTINA H. CENG*
INTRODUCTION
When thirteen-year-old Tommy C. was abandoned by Ins parents, the
juvenile court placed him in a juvenile detention facility so that he
would be kept off the streets and would receive rehabilitative treatment
and counseling. Frightened and unhappy in one of the facility's cottages,
Tommy C. tried to leave the grounds. As a result, he was transferred
to Block 2, a closed-off wing of the mimmum security building of an
adult correctional institution, used primarily for disciplinary and escape
problems. In Block 2, Tommy C. and another boy were placed in a
room secured by a locked door and barred windows with broken panes.
Meals were eaten in the adult cafeteria where contact with convicted
adults was inevitable. Recreational, medical and educational programs
were virtually nonexistent.
Tommy C. was never accused or convicted of a crime. Instead, he
was victimized by his parents and the juvenile court system, the two
entities whose purpose was to provide him with the care and protection
essential for any child.,
Tommy C. is a fictional character, yet real children have suffered similar
experiences. In 1972, five juveniles committed to Rhode Island's Boys'
Training School (the "School") filed a civil rights class action seeking a
prelimnary injunction against the institution to prevent further confinement
in the maximum security Adult Correctional Institution, in solitary confine-
ment cells located in a wing of the adult minimum security building, and
in the cold, poorly furnished and unsanitary, steel cellblocks of a dilapidated
former women's reformatory.2 Some of the plaintiffs had been confined
for their own protection; these were victims of parental neglect or aban-
donment. Others were wayward children, pretrial detainees or delinquents;3
none was a chronic, hard-core offender.
Holding that the existing conditions of confinement constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and violated the plaintiffs' due process and equal
protection rights, the district court pointed to a lack of trained personnel
and regular medical treatment, inadequate facilities, virtually nonexistent
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1986,
University of Micigan.
1. This story is loosely based on the facts of Inmates of Boys' Traimng School v. Affleck,
346 F Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
2. Id. at 1357.
3. Id. at 1369.
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educational, recreational and counseling programs, and continual contact
with adult inmates from whom the plaintiffs and class members learned
"tricks of the trade" or were subjected to threats.4 The court considered
the solitary confinement cells "inhuman" and "deplorable." 5
Juveniles who presented escape and disciplinary problems could be trans-
ferred from School grounds, without notice or a hearing, into solitary or
maximum security confinement. There were no specific criteria used to
determine which offenses would result in the juvenile's transfer to the
maximum security building.6 Thus, a victim of parental neglect was as likely
to be transferred as a convicted delinquent. The senousness of this situation
was compounded by the fact that juveniles confined to maximum security
were subjected to the same rules and punishments as were adult pnsoners. 7
The court concluded that the School failed in its parens patriae capacity to
meet even minimal requirements necessary to rehabilitate, rather than to
punish, its juvenile inmates:' .'If the constitutional provision against cruel
4. Id. at 1362.
5. Id. at 1365. In one typical case, a juvenile inmate who had been assigned to a solitary
confinement cell in "Annex B" for seven to ten days testified that the cell was completely
dark and was cold because of the winter air that blew in through a broken window. He wore
only his underwear and was refused a change 4 clothes. He did not receive soap, toilet paper,
sheets or a blanket. Because the mattress covering was worn-out, he was forced to sleep on
the spnngs. He was never allowed to leave the cell. Id. at 1362-63. Annex B was considered
less severe confinement than the other annex cells. Id. at 1360.
6. Id. at 1359.
7. Id. at 1362.
8. See id. Parens patrzae, literally "parent of the country," refers to the state's protective
role as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability, BLACK's LAW DicTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990), suggesting that a child is not the absolute property of the parents, but
rather, is entrusted to the parents by the parens patrae state. It is the state's ultimate duty,
however, to ensure the safety and care of the helpless and incompetent child, and when that
child is deemed a delinquent, it is the state's responsibility to "treat" or "rehabilitate" rather
than to pumsh. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). The juvenile judge's responsibility is to
determine .'[w]hat [he is], how [he has] become what he is, and what had best be done in
his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career."' Id. at 15
(quoting Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv L. REv 104, 119-20 (1909)).
Over the years, the state's scope and nature of responsibility over a child has been subjected
to vast reinterpretation. In the 1989 eyebrow-raising opimon DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause did not impose an affirmative duty on the state to provide protection to a child
from private violence. In DeShaney, the mother of a four-year-old boy brought a § 1983
action against social workers and local officials who had received numerous complaints of
child abuse by the father but failed to remove the child from his custody. Id. at 1001. The
child subsequently suffered permanent brain damage and became profoundly retarded as a
result of the severe beatings. Id. at 1002. While the Court sympathized with the child's plight,
it distinguished DeShaney from the situation in which the state takes an individual into custody
against his will (thereby depriving him of life, liberty or property); only the latter imposes a
duty on the state to provide treatment and protection. Id. at 1003.
The DeShaney case should be contrasted with K.H. ex rel Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846
(7th Cir. 1990), in which the court refused to grant qualified immunity from liability to social
workers who had removed a seventeen-month-old girl from the custody of her parents after
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and unusual punishment has any meaning, the evidence in this case shows
that it has been violated. The cruelty is a refined sort, much more com-
parable to the Chinese water torture than to such crudities as breaking on
the wheel."' 9
Ten years later, in D.B. v. Tewksbury,'0 an Oregon district court held
that confining status offenders and juvenile pretrial, detainees" in adult
correctional facilities violated their due process rights and constituted pretrial
punishments.' 2 The Columbia County Correctional Facility (CCCF) housed
both convicted adult prisoners and children between the ages of twelve and
eighteen who were primarily status offenders awaiting adjudication." Chil-
dren could be placed in CCCF for shelter and care as well; thus, child-rape
victims could become inmates.' 4 Although these children were not detained
in CCCF for inordinate periods of time,'" physical and psychological harms
were likely to result from confinement under less-than acceptable condi-
tions.' 6 The state's need to shelter juvenile victims and hold status offenders
learning she had contracted gonorrhea from vaginal intercourse. They placed her in foster
homes nine times before she had reached the age of six; these transfers included one return
to her natural parents (from whom she was subsequently removed on grounds of parental
neglect) and to at least two other foster homes in which she was physically or sexually abused.
Id. at 848. The court held that while the state had no constitutional obligation to protect the
child from her parents' abuse per DeShaney, the state assumed responsibility for her safety
and care once it had removed her from her parents' custody: "Once the state assumes custody
of a person, it owes [her] a rudimentary duty of safekeeping no matter how perilous [her]
circumstances when [she] was free. [T]he absence of a duty to rescue does not entitle a
rescuer to harm the person whom he has rescued." Id. at 849.
9. Inmates, 346'F Supp. at 1365 (quoting Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F Supp. 93, 99
(N.D. Ohio 1971), aff 'd, 456 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1972)).
10. 545 F Supp. 896 (D. Or. 1982).
11. A status offender is a child who commits "an act of noncrunnal misbehavior." M.
SOLER, J. BELL, E. JAMESON, C. SHAFFER, A. SHoTToN & L. WAmnoys, RPREsmrNINo THE
CHiLD CLiENT, 5.02[1], atP 5-10 (1990) [hereinafter CHILD CuaNT]. These offenses include
truancy, running away, disobeying reasonable parental demands and incorrigibility. Their
criminal nature is determined solely by the age of the perpetrator and would not constitute
an offense if committed by an adult. Id.
A child is a pretnal detainee when there has been no adjudication regarding his status, acts
or behavior. Tewksbury, 545 F Supp. at 898.
For purposes of this Note, nonoffenders are defined as juveniles who have been abused,
neglected or abandoned.
12. Tewksbury, 545 F Supp. at 904-07.
13. Id. at 898.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 905 (listing "extraordinary" conditions). Children held in CCCF did not
receive mattress covers, pillows or sheets; they slept on mattresses covered with urethane and
were given a wool blanket. If no mattresses were available (as was the case in isolation cells),
they slept on the concrete floor. All personal clothing was confiscated and replaced with CCCF
clothing; no underwear was allowed. Female children had to make personal requests for
sanitary napkins or tampons from a male corrections officer who, in turn, contacted a matron,
since matrons were not stationed in the detention area. Because toilet and shower facilities
were not screened from view, users were visible to others, including members of the opposite
1991]
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and pretrial detainees did not constitute .a legitimate governmental purpose
sufficient to override CCCF's rehabilitative duty. 17 The court ruled that it
was "fundamentally fair" to deny children charged with crimes the same
rights made available to adults, but only if that denial were offset by a
"special solitude" rather than simply lodging them in adult prisons under
the guise of parens patriae. 11
A recent case reveals that juveniles continue to be subjected to similar
problems. In September of 1990, the federal district court in Maine held
that a juvenile who had been incarcerated for four days in a county jail
for alleged unauthorized use of a motor vehicle could bring a section 1983
action to seek relief for infringement of his constitutional rights.' 9 After his
arrest, for a violation that only would have been treated as a misdemeanor
if committed by an adult, the fifteen-year-old plaintiff was allegedly strip
searched during the "processing" phase at which time he allegedly heard
comments from the prison staff implying the threat of sexual attack by
adult prisoners. 20 He allegedly was confined to a cell within sight and sound
of adult prisoners, denied the opportunity to speak to an attorney or to
family members and deprived of counseling and outdoor exercise. 21 The
court held that the facility used to confine the plaintiff and the alleged
circumstances surrounding that confinement constituted a clear violation of
the requirements of the Juvenile Justice Act, thus leaving county comums-
sioners vulnerable to potential liability under section 1983.2
It is an unfortunate fact that many juveniles in today's society commit
crimes of such a heinous nature that punishment is easily justified as the
proper response. The widespread distribution and use of drugs, combined
with the alarming growth of local gangs, have contributed to the rise in
sex. Sometimes, children were placed in isolation cells-eight-by-eight foot windowless concrete
rooms containing nothing but a sewer hole near the center of the cell which served as a toilet.
Corrections officers controlled the flushing mechanism winch they used at random. When the
sewer hole was "flushed," water and sewage splashed several inches above the cell floor.
Children shared the same passageways with adult prisoners and were able to communicate
with them in both the regular and isolation cells. Some were subjected to verbal threats and
sexually explicit gestures. There were no educational, recreational or exercise programs available
for children. There were no formal, written policies or critena addressing the care and treatment
of juveniles. Id. at 898-902.
17 Id. at 905-06.
18. Id. at 906-07.
19. Grenier v. Kennebec County, 748 F Supp. 908 (D. Me. 1990). Since this case came
before the court on separate motions to dismiss by the defendants, the court did not rule
explicitly on the veracity of the facts. However, because the plaintiff was seeking damages for
psychological and emotional duress, and because the court did find that his incarceration was
"wholly inconsistent" with the requirements of the Juvenile Justice Act, d. at 915, the case
is pertinent to this discussion.
20. Id. at 910.
21. Id. at 910-11.
22. Id. at 915, 918.
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violent criminal behavior by juveniles.2 While the immediacy of this problem
is certain, this Note does not address the parens patriae doctrine within
that context.2 Rather, it focuses primarily on those youths who are consid-
ered "nonviolent": minor delinquency offenders, status offenders and ne-
glected or abandoned children, whose real need for protection is overlooked
by lawmakers and law enforcers concentrating on severe juvenile violence.
This Note will analyze the constitutional, statutory and civil wrongs
involved with the incarceration of juveniles in adult prisons which obstruct
the admimstration of the parenspatrae doctrine. Part I provides an overview
of the problems facing juveniles confined in adult institutions. Part II
discusses how the shortcomngs of the juvenile justice system violate the
legal rights of juveniles. Reformers' efforts to change existing conditions in
23. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1.4 of the estimated 14.3 million
arrests for 1989 directly involved drug abuse. Umuroim CiEm REPoRTS 1989: CIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 171 [hereinafter UNirom CRIME REPoRTs]. For arrests involving people under
the age of 18, approximately 90,000 were for drug abuse violations. Id. at 188. Overall, the
drug abuse violation arrest total for 1989 was 20% lugher than in 1988, 55% higher than in
1985 and 126% lugher than in 1980. Id. at 171. In Los Angeles County alone, cocaine deaths
increased 205% between 1984 and 1987. Organized Criminal Activity by Youth Gangs: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 56 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Los Angeles County Assistant Sheriff
Jerry Harper).
Los Angeles, considered the "Gang Capital of the United States," is home to more than
650 gangs with a reported memberslup of 70,000. Id. at 59. While street gangs have been in
existence since the 1920s, two highly aggressive and violent gangs-the Cnps and the Pirus,
or Bloods-surfaced in 1970 and turned the processing and marketing of crack (raw cocaine)
into an extremely lucrative business. Id. at 41 (statement of Cluef of Police Ivory Webb,
Compton Police Department, Los Angeles). Approximately 275 active sects of the Cnps and
the Bloods in Los Angeles help to maintain drug trafficking through the use of crack distribution
outlets in dozens of United States cities. Id. at 20-21 (statement of Robert C. Bonner, U.S.
Attorney for Central District of California).
In 1987, the number of gang-related murders in Los Angeles was almost four times the
number of those reported m New York, Chicago, Philadelphia and San Diego combined. Id.
at 112 (statement of Richard Alarcon, Gang/Drug Programs Coordinator for Los Angeles
Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice Planning). From 1986 to 1987, crime between gangs rose
88%. Gang homicides increased by 33%, violent felonies by 11% and gang-related weapon
seizures by 80.3%. Id. at 59 (statement of Los Angeles County Assistant Sheriff Jerry Harper).
Contrary to popular belief, gangs attack the public more than they do each other. Of the
3,992 gang-related violent felonies reported within the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Depart-
ment's jurisdiction in 1987, over 3,000 of those victims were innocent citizens. Id. at 62; see
also Bryant, Communitywide Responses Crucial for Dealing with Youth Gangs, OJJDP Juv.
JUST. BULL., Sept. 1989, at 2-3 (maintaining that the increased demand for drugs (in particular,
crack cocaine) has contributed to the nse in gang membership, although drug trafficking by
gangs is not as organized or sophisticated as once presumed); McKinney, Juvenile Gangs:
Crime and Drug Trafficking, OJJDP Juv. JUST. BULL., Sept. 1988, at 3 (quoting a Chicago
Deputy Police Chief who believes that the lenient juvenile justice system, which attempts to
avoid punishment for youth offenders, only serves to further encourage juvenile recruitment
in gangs, since penalties for juveniles who commit crimes are almost nonexistent and adult
gang members are insulated from arrest).
24. However, because of the nature of the topic and the close relationship between the
two categories of juvenile offenders, this Note will refer to the problems that affect "violent"
youths as well.
10031991]
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the system will be analyzed in light of recent court decisions and govern-
mental actions, including the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act (JJDPA) and the expansion of liability claims and recovery
measures. Part III addresses alternative rehabilitation programs that reform-
ers have implemented as contemporary solutions to some of the inadequacies
plaguing the juvenile justice system. Finally, Part IV proposes drafting and
implementing a comprehensive model juvenile code and calls for revamping
the juvenile justice system to emphasize increased regulatory control by the
states.
I. PROBLEMS FACING JUVENILES IN ADULT JAILS
Juvenile crime is on the rise, and the brutality and severity of the acts
committed have lawmakers and law enforcers concerned with curbing, if
not eliminating, the wave of violence that has marked the past decade.Y
Undoubtedly, drugs have greatly contributed to the problem, especially with
the introduction of popular substances like "crack," an inexpensive and
almost instantaneously addictive form of cocaine that has created a huge
market of desperate buyers, 26 thus providing a lucrative commodity for
young entrepreneurs.
Contributing to the expanding drug problem is the alarnung increase in
the popularity of gangs, whose sustenance often largely depends on the
illegal sale and distribution of drugs. Gang membership is attracting a larger
number of children who are joining at younger ages, 27 thus increasing the
25. One of the more shocking examples of juvenile violence made "wilding" a household
term after the brutal rape of a female jogger in Central Park by members of a New York
gang. The crime made national headlines in April 1989. The perpetrators of the attack ranged
in age from fourteen to sixteen-years-old. The reasons given for the attack: "[ilt was fun"
and "[i]t was something to do." Gibbs, Wilding in the Night, TImE, May 8, 1989, at 20-21.
26. See "Crack Cocaine" Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1986) (opening statement
of subcommittee chairman William Roth) [hereinafter "Crack Cocaine"]. Not only does the
demand for crack cocaine provide business opportunities for children, but the one-unit dosage
packaging price of approximately ten dollars makes the drug affordable for their own
consumption. Id. at 9 (prepared statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles); id. at 15-16 (testimony of
Charles Schuster, director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse); id. at 87-88 (statement
by Dr. Robert Byck, professor, Yale University School of Medicine).
27 As one chief of police stated:
Youths as young as 8 and 10 years old are accepted into gangs now, where their
utility is not their warrior skills, but their ability to serve as lookouts, and to
escape the harsher cnminal penalties generally reserved for veteran "home boys."
These kids are soon sucked into the drug selling machinery and take their place
in a sales pyramid where kingpins can rake in as much as $2,000 a week.
Hearings, supra note 23, at 49 (testimony of Inglewood, California Chief of Police Raymond
Johnson); see also "Crack Cocaine, " supra note 26, at 10 (prepared statement of Sen. Lawton
Chiles) ("Crack is spreading, it is affecting our children and grandchildren, and it is igniting
a crime wave."); id. at 43-44 (testimony of Michael Taylor, former employee of a "crack
house") auveniles as young as ten years old are employed at crack houses; they can make as
much as one hundred dollars per night).
1004 [Vol. 66:999
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possibility that they will commit delinquent acts before reaching adulthood. 2
As lawmakers struggle to combat these problems, they are faced with the
additional dilemma of prosecuting violent, chromc offenders within the
confines of the parens patriae doctrine. Responding to a political climate
that advocates a "get tough" attitude, legislative and judicial bodies are
reluctant to prescribe rehabilitative and treatment-onented measures for
these youths for fear they will appear too lenient on juvenile crime.
Yet, in the process of cracking down on violent, hard-core juvenile
delinquents, lawmakers-and law enforcers generally-fail to separate a
surprisingly large group of juveniles who commit only minor crimes or
status offenses. 29 Many are no more than victims of parental abuse or
neglect who are incarcerated for their own protection. 0 A 1985 study found
that of the approximately 479,000 juveniles locked in adult jails throughout
the United States, only ten percent were held for senous offenses. Twenty
percent were jailed for status offenses, and four percent-more than 19,000-
were detained without having committed any offense. This latter group
included neglected, handicapped and retarded children as well as "throwa-
ways," juveniles forced from their homes by parental abuse or economic
reasons.31 Over rune percent of those juveniles were thirteen years old or
younger.3 2 Nonoffenders, status offenders, pretrial detainees and minor
delinquents are incarcerated for various reasons: to ease the burden of the
juvenile courts, to protect the community, to reduce the child's potential
for hurting himself, to protect the child from a dangerous home environ-
ment, to deter the child from further crimnal acts, to ensure the child's
appearance at court hearings, to provide temporary detention until placement
in another facility or to hold an uncontrollable child at a parent's request.33
The result is that those in need of the state's parens patriae protection are
treated in too similar a manner to their more violent counterparts. The
physical, mental and psychological harms inflicted on these youths make
their incarceration "the most insidious form of child abuse, because it is
state-sanctioned." 34
28. See Plummer, The Crack Kid, PEOPLE (ExmRA), Fall 1989, at 73. Since crack first
appeared in the early 1980s, juvenile arrests across the United States have tripled. Id., see also
UNurOm Cini RmoaTs, supra note 23, at 171 (from 1980 to 1989, the total number of
arrests for drug abuse violations increased 126%).
29. Note, Jailing Juveniles: Impact on Constitutional Rights, 13 NEw ENO. J. ON CRIn.
& Civ. CognEmENT 45, 52 (1987).
30. See Press, When Children Go to Jail, NEwswEim, May 27, 1985, at 87.
31. OFFICE OF JUVENmE JusTicE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILES IN ADULT JAILS
AND LocKups: IT'S YoUR MoVE 1 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter JuvENiLEs ir ADULT JAn.S] (copy
on file with the Indiana Law Journal). The study was conducted by the Community Research
Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign under a grant awarded by the United
States Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 2.
34. Press, supra note 30, at 87 (quoting Paul Mones, legal director of the Public Justice
Foundation, Santa Momca, California).
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The study showed that even short periods of incarceration can cause
severe and irreparable damage. The data revealed that the suicide rate
among juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons was five times higher than
the rate among youths in the general population" and eight times higher
than the rate among those committed to juvenile detention centers.3 6 The
hostile environment, lack of privacy and unsanitary conditions intensify
feelings of fear and anxiety among youths,3 7 regardless of the amount of
time they are forced to spend in jail. In fact, the first few hours of
confinement can be the most dangerous;" if feelings of hopelessness and
despair feed on the fear of being trapped in a locked cell, the terrified
youth may opt for an extreme response as the only available solution to
escape hIs immediate situation.3 9 Furthermore, juveniles under the influence
of drugs or alcohol can experience a heightened sense of confusion, lone-
liness and abandonment; 40 and, as corrections officers often do not have
the traimng necessary to meet the needs of a drugged or intoxicated child,
these youths are even more likely to harm themselves. 4' In addition, countless
incarcerated juveniles fall victim to sexual assault, exploitation and other
physical injury at the hands of guards, adult prisoners and even other
juvenile inmates,42 thereby exposing juveniles to physical and psychological
harm. 43
Because adult prisons are rarely equipped with educational and recrea-
tional facilities for children, 44 confinement in these institutions may lend
35. JuvEBuas IN ADULT JAUS, supra note 31, at 3.
36. Id.
37 See Note, supra note 29, at 50; see also Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social
Servs., 322 F Supp. 473, 480-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (testimony of psychiatrists in which they
unammously condemned isolation practices for juveniles due to their destructive effects).
38. Press, supra note 30, at 89.
39. See, e.g., Long v. Collins, No. 89-0901 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1991) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
library) (a seventeen-year-old, jailed for intoxication and uncooperative behavior, hanged
himself after learning that his mother declined to pick hm up until the following mormng);
Press, supra note 30, at 89 (a fifteen-year-old hanged himself after spending thirty minutes in
a Kentucky jail for arguing with his mother).
40. Note, supra note 29, at 51.
41. In D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F Supp. 896, 900 (D. Or. 1982), one of the plaintiffs who
was arrested while intoxicated was placed in isolation for being uncooperative. He did not
receive any medical treatment until after he shattered a finger and broke several teeth. Another
intoxicated juvenile who acted belligerently was left in Ins cell in handcuffs. He received no
medical attention or assistance and was later found in his cell m a pool of vomit and urine.
Id.
42. Soler, Dale & Flake, Stubborn and Rebellious Children: Liability of Public Officials
for Detention of Children in Jails, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV 1, 5-6; see also Doe v. McFaul, 599
F Supp. 1421, 1427 (D. Oho 1984) (male juvenile plaintiffs were sexually attacked by other
male juvenile inmates who were incarcerated m the same cell).
43. Although the actual physical and psychological effects of detention on juveniles are
uncertain, the continual output of reports, studies and literature suggests that the issue is far
from being resolved. A. ROBERTS, JUVENUE JUSTICE: PoucIEs, PROGRAMs, AND SERVICES 157-
58 (1989).
44. CHIILD CLIENT, supra note I1, J 2.02, at 2-72.
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itself to idleness, boredom and depression among juvenile inmates. The one
area in which juveniles do receive schooling is crime; association with adult
offenders who teach them advanced criminal techniques and provide criminal
contacts encourages delinquent behavior. 41 As high rates of recidivism belie
the belief that incarceration has a deterrent effect on future delinquency, 46
the notion that a child can be "scared straight" by detaining him for any
length of time is a dangerous misconception and an unrealistic proposition.47
Furthermore, while federal and state statutes prohibit the incarceration
of juveniles with adult inmates, no existing laws mandate the separation of
nonviolent delinquents, status offenders or nonoffenders from chronic, hard-
core juvenile offenders. 4 Considering the nature and extent of the crimes
committed by the latter, it is likely that incarcerating these two groups
together would have detrimental effects similar to those caused by incar-
ceration with adults.
The juvenile court system itself is also responsible for the ineffectiveness
of its deterrence measures, because vague statutes and arbitrary methods of
assigning punishment fail to reflect any sense of justice that might otherwise
inspire remorse in the juvenile offender. 49 If the juvenile cannot perceive
his punishment as appropriate or reasonable, it is more likely that he will
view the risk and severity of punishment as a gamble rather than as an
absolute certainty.10 If "nonviolent" juveniles are incarcerated, they are
more likely to view the justice system as unfair for doling out arbitrary and
exorbitant punishments, thus undermining the rehabilitative purpose of
confinement. The only real guarantee is that
by placing a child in jail, he is made to feel like a prisoner. If a juvenile
feels like a prisoner, he will begin to act like one which frustrates the
purpose most judges cite for ordering confinement in an adult facility:
to frighten juveniles away from a future life of crime.,,
45. Soler, Dale & Flake, supra note 42, at 6-7.
46. Id.
47. Unaware of the dangers that exist in prison settings, parents of a seventeen-year-old
Idaho boy supported the idea of incarcerating their son for nonpayment of $73 worth of
traffic tickets m the hopes that the "taste of jail" would dissuade him from further delinquency.
He was tortured and then beaten to death by his cellmates, prompting a 1982 ruling that
prohibited all but the most violent juveniles from being jailed in Boise. Press, supra note 30,
at 87, 89. Furthermore, in the case of an Ohio juvenile court judge who implemented a
program based on the philosophy behind the "Scared Straight" television movie, the district
court held that this practice violated the juvenile inmates' due process and eighth amendment
rights. McFaul, 599 F Supp. 1421.
48. Even in those facilities that separate the more dangerous juvenile offenders from the
rest of the prison population, there often is opportunity for contact with one another. See
infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
49. Note, supra note 29, at 65.
50. Note, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked by the Parens
Patnae Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 174, 191 n.70 (1985).
51. Note, supra note 29, at 65 (citations omitted).
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Under such conditions, it is unlikely that incarceration will forestall future
delinquent behavior.
In a sense, a juvenile's expenence in prison can be likened to a product's
development in a factory- the juvenile may enter as a rough delinquent and
exit as a polished criminal. During his confinement he may endure physical,
mental and psychological abuse by adult and other juvenile inmates which
destroys his self-esteem and reinforces a negative self-image. 2 He may learn
to view the outside world with cynicism, distrust and cautious apprehension,
an attitude which is reinforced by the criminal stigma that society attaches
to him and which interferes with family and community relationships and
precludes him from emerging as a "law-abiding productive adult[]."" In
the best of situations, the juvenile will not suffer so much as to handicap
all future rehabilitative efforts.
Aside from a moral standpoint, there are legal implications to consider;
in fact, neglected or abandoned children are deprived of their legal rights
because of their status, which is constitutionally forbidden. A Many of the
practices involved in the incarceration of juveniles in adult jails violate
general principles of constitutional law as well as federal and state statutes.
II. A HISTORY OF INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTIONS
Anglo-American law has historically provided mimmal protection for
juvenile offenders, whose status as minors precludes them from receiving
the same rights and procedures afforded adults. While a growing awareness
of the need to expand juvenile protections to fit society's expectations has
led to increased legislation, the primary obstacle to protecting juvenile rights
in practice is the failure of both courts and detention facilities to apply
specific criteria to the cases before them. Although professional standards
committees and legal organizations have offered guidelines, state governments
have either failed to adopt or to comply with them. As a result, arbitrary
and capricious rulings often govern the treatment and care of juveniles
detained in correctional facilities.
A. The Common Law Rights of a Juvenile
The concept of parens patriae originated in the early fifteenth century
with the King's Court in England, which made it a practice to assume
52. Soler, Dale & Flake, supra note 42, at 7
53. Tewksbury, 545 F Supp. at 903 (emphasis in onginal).
54. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F Supp. 1354, 1371-72 (D.R.I.
1972). See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (while the possession or use
of an illegal substance may be a criminal offense, it is unconstitutional to convict an individual
for being a drug addict; one cannot be punished for mere status or chronic condition).
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responsibility over neglected and abandoned children.5 The parens patrae
doctrine originally emphasized the importance of maintaimng the family
unit by allowing parents to raise their children as they saw fit without
interference by the state.5 6 The state's role was supplementary and was
justified only when there was a compelling reason, such as protecting the
child from parental abuse. 7
Yet, when a benevolent court was precluded from acting in its parens
patriae role, juvenile offenders faced punishment akin to hardened criunals.
Reformers' efforts to change this practice resulted in the establishment of
a separate court system that replaced traditional notions of pumshment with
a "clinical" approach emphasizing rehabilitation and treatment."
55. Note, supra note 29, at 46.
56. Constitutional Rights of Children, American Law Division, Congressional Research
Service of the Library of Congress, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1978).
57. Id. When the state seeks permanent termination of parental rights in their natural
child, it must support allegations of parental abuse by at least "clear and convincing evidence."
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). The Court replaced the "fair preponderance
of the evidence" standard usually applied in juvenile proceedings with a higher burden of
proof due to the severity of private interests affected and the high risk of error created by
the state's chosen procedure. Id. at 758.
58. Although the historical origin of the juvenile court remains unclear, two schools of
thought predominate. Founders of the orthodox interpretation identify the founding as a result
of the "humane impulse merging with social science through a legal catalyst to replace the
barbarous and vengeful cruelties of the criminal law with something better." F FAUST & P
BrAnnmoHr, JuvEam JusncE PmwsoPHY 550 (1974). At common law, children under the
age of seven were deemed incapable of criminal intent; children between seven and fourteen
were presumed incapable, but that presumption could be rebutted. If the state were successful,
the child was tried by a criminal court. Children over the age of fourteen were considered
adults and thus were automatically under the jurisdiction of the criminal court. Id. at 550-51.
These founders sought to remove troubled children from the harsh sentences and inhumane
treatment of the adult criminal courts by establishing a separate legal process that could
provide a more beneficial method for controlling juvenile behavior. Id. at 551.
The orthodox followers linked causes of delinquency to problems of heredity and an
unhealthy social and physical environment, but because they viewed children as "infinitely
malleable" and "the best possible subjects for the new social sciences to work wonders upon,"
they saw a legal catalyst in the form of a benevolent court acting as parens patnae as the
appropriate mechanism to intervene and circumvent any further problems that might arise in
homes marked by parental irresponsibility and urban temptation. Id. at 551-52.
In contrast, revisionists regarded the juvenile court as the product of the evolution of the
criunal court system rather than a departure from it. Id. at 522. They rejected the claimed
humanistic motives of the orthodox analysis; revisionists believed the orthodox interpretation
served as a means for the socio-economic elite to manipulate the lower class while establishing
a "socially acceptable" means of expanding their political power and improving their careers.
Id. at 555.
Revisionists believed that the existing biases against pauper families served as an impetus to
use the civil poor laws to disrupt the lower income family nucleus by placing its children in
reformatories, and that throughout the nineteenth century, the courts continued to blur the
distinction between dependent and delinquent children by using the informal procedures of the
poor laws to deal with both types of children. Id. at 555. This progression culminated in the
founding of the juvenile court. The juvenile court was thus a means of justifying the earlier
destruction of the lower class family and replacing less desirable environments with healthier
ones. Id. at 557.
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Furthermore, while exemption from criminal law did not impute immunity
from punishment, juvenile proceedings became primarily civil in nature,
rather than criminal or adversanal. 9
Nonetheless, problems with the interpretation and application of the
parens patriae doctrine throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s resulted
in the formulation-and subsequent violation-of juveniles' constitutional
rights. Because the philosophy of parens patriae allowed for substantial
differences between juvenile and adult proceedings, it was possible to
imprison juveniles under the guise of the parens patriae doctrine without
affording them the same rights as adults. 0 As a result, "there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that
he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 61 In response to this
concern, the courts began to create constitutional safeguards against viola-
tions of juvenile rights.
B. The Due Process Rights of a Juvenile
In 1966, the Supreme Court established the foundation for the expansion
of juvenile rights in Kent v. United States.62 In Kent, the Court held that
a "full investigation" would be required in all future proceedings before
waiver of jurisdiction to an adult court could be considered.63 A year later,
in its landmark decision In re Gault,6 the Court used the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause to make applicable to juveniles certain
basic constitutional protections already enjoyed by adults accused of crimes.
These included the right to sufficient notice of charges, the right to counsel,
the right to be informed of the right to counsel, the right to invoke the
59. "Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of the child as parens patrae and
not as adversary, courts have relied on the premise that the proceedings are 'civil' m nature
and not 'cnminal' " Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966); see Pee v. United
States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (containing a list of cases for fifty-one
jurisdictions, which hold that juvenile cases are not considered criminal proceedings).
60. See Doe v. McFaul, 599 F Supp. 1421, 1428 (D. Ohio 1984) ("[luveniles who are
deprived of the liberty without the full due process rights enjoyed by adults receive m return
rehabilitative and individual treatment rather than mere punitive incarceration."); D.B. v.
Tewksbury, 545 F Supp. 896, 906 (D. Or. 1982) ("It is, then, fundamentally fair-constitu-
tional-to deny children charged with cnmes rights available to adults charged with crimes if
that denial is offset by a special solicitude designed for children.").
61. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
62. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
63. A "full investigation" includes the right to assistance by counsel, the right of counsel
to access to the juvenile's social records, a requirement that the court give reasons for allowing
or denying waiver (thus granting judges discretionary but not arbitrary decision-making power),
and the right to a hearing that complied with at least minmal standards of due process and
fair treatment. Id. at 560-63.
64. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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privilege against self-incrinunation and the right to confrontation and cross-
examination. 61 Subsequent rulings provided juveniles the right to be tried
for criminal acts under a "proof beyond reasonable doubt" standard" and
the right against double jeopardy.67
However, the state has "a parens patrae interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child.' ' Acknowledging this fundamental
difference between adult and juvenile proceedings, the Court's interpretation
of the Constitution does not require elimination of all differences between
the treatment of adult and juvenile offenders. 69 Furthermore, because the
state's role as parens patriae is that of protector rather than pumsher, 70 the
incarceration of children is allowed only for rehabilitation and treatment
purposes. Because there is "no legitimate interest in pumshing such juveniles
as retribution for past misdeeds . . restrictions on their liberty must be
justified on the basis of other objectives-rehabilitation, safety, or internal
order and security." 7' Such broadly defined goals, based on inexact criteria,
grant substantial leeway to officials in the judicial system to justify their
determination of what constitutes rehabilitation or treatment. The Supreme
Court further encourages arbitrary decisionmaking by the balancing test it
sets forth, because it allows judges wide discretion when weighing the child's
private liberty interests against society's interest in protecting itself and the
government's fiscal and administrative integrity.72
In addition, the juvenile court system today faces huge problems with
conditions at facilities in which juveniles are confined. Regardless of past
reforms and present legislation, the theory behind parens patriae, and the
reality of its practice, fail to further the purpose of the system. As a result,
65. Id. at 33-34, 41-42, 47-56.
66. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Prior to Winship, juveniles could be tried for
crimes under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Id. at 360.
67. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
68. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
69. For example, although a juvenile court judge may, at his discretion, use an advisory
jury, no constitutional right to a jury trial exists in juvenile proceedings. McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). More recently, the Court's deterrmnation in a fourth
amendment search and seizure ciaim brought by a juvenile against public school authorities
replaced "probable cause" with a lesser standard of "reasonableness," depending on the
context within which the search took place. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
70. See supra note 8.
71. Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 1986). The same court had previously
permitted the limited use of isolation to maintain institutional order and safety, but because
of a "due process interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint," the decision to use
isolation deserves ciose scrutiny by the court. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1181 (lst
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). The states also exercise parental control over
juveniles in the belief that children lack the necessary "experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." BeIlotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 635 (1979).
72. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Santosky, 455 U.S.
745; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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delinquent juveniles are discriminated against because of their age and,
ironically, would probably receive more protection if tried within the juris-
diction of the adult criminal system.
C. The Eighth Amendment Rights of a Juvenile
The eighth amendment to the Constitution reads, "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." ' While it is true that juvenile offenders are tried under
different standards and receive different rights than their adult counterparts,
the eighth amendment still entitles them to most of the protections set forth
in the Constitution.74
Juveniles are deprived of many of the benefits of the law of this state,
merely because of their immaturity. They are not permitted to vote, to
contract, to purchase alcoholic beverages or to marry without the consent
of their parents. It seems inconsistent that one be denied the fruits of
the tree of the law, yet subjected to all of its thorns. 5
Yet, the concept of "cruel and unusual punishment" has always been
vaguely defined and broadly applied, because it "changes with the continual
development of society and with sociological views concerning the punish-
ment for crime." '76 Courts have held that cruel and unusual punishment
includes many forms of prisoner treatment, from intentional humiliation
and psychological abuse to physical beatings.77 For example, in Nelson v
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
74. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
"Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
75. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968).
76. Id., see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (the concept of cruel
and unusual punishment is not concrete "but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, I01 (1958) ("The [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a matunng society."). At common law, capital punishment could theoretically
apply to anyone over the age of seven, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, reh'g denied, 110
S. Ct. 23 (1989), and while imposing the death penalty is not absolutely forbidden, "'individ-
ualized consideration [is] a constitutional requirement,"' id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 605 (1978)), and the juvenile's age is an individualized mitigating factor that must
be taken into consideration. Id. The death penalty is used sparingly though, so while a fifteen-
year-old could be transferred to an adult court for an offense deemed more appropriate for
determination using adult standards, a general prohibition on the death penalty for juveniles
still remains in effect. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989) (the Indiana
Supreme Court overturned a death penalty sentence for a minor, who was convicted of murder
for stabbing a 78-year-old Bible-studies teacher thirty-three times, because the sentence consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment under both federal and state law); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988) (the Supreme Court prohibited the use of capital punishment for a fifteen-
year-old who participated m the brutal murder of his former brother-in-law and disposed of
the body by chaining it to a cement block and throwing it into a river).
77 CmwD CLmNTr, supra note I1, 2.0117], at 2-66.
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Heyne,7s the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit looked to Furman
v. Georga 9 in its holding that the correctional institution's practice of
disciplimng juvenile inmates with a "fraternity paddle" up to two inches
thick violated the juveniles' eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. 0 The
beatings only increased hostilities in the school and "substantially frustrated
its rehabilitative purpose.""' Furthermore, because pumshment should con-
form to the degree of the offender's culpability,82 the beatings constituted
an excessive form of discipline for approximately one-third of the juveniles
who were noncrinminal offenders.83 Similarly, the court held that indiscrim-
inate and unsupervised use of tranquilizing drugs to control "excited"
behavior constituted cruel and unusual punishment and would not be
condoned unless authorized by a physician for medical reasons.84
The courts have also placed limits on the widespread use of physical
restraints, allowing their use only under very specific circumstances. 85 In
particular, the practice of hogtying juveniles is "degrading, dangerous, and
unconstitutional. ' 86 Thus, even when it is necessary to restrain an inmate,
that inmate retains a liberty interest in freedom of movement, depending
on the extent to which the restraint violates his constitutional rights to
personal safety and due process of law.87
Correctional institutions also use isolation cells as a method of restraint.
In Lolis v. New York Department of Social Services,"8 a fourteen-year-old
78. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
79. 408 U.S. 238 (1971). In Furman, Justice Brennan attempted to define the boundaries
of the use of punishment: "If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to
achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, the punishment inflicted is
unnecessary and therefore excessive." Id. at 279 (citations omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Staff members, some weighing as much as 285 pounds, would beat juveniles weighing
160 pounds on their clothed buttocks, causing severe parn, blisters, bruises and even bleeding.
Nelson, 491 F.2d at 354 & n.3.
81. Id. at 356.
82. See, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. 815; California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. 586.
83. Nelson, 491 F.2d at 353.
84. Id. at 357.
85. Cimn CamNT, supra note 11, 2.0117], at 2-59 to 2-61. Courts have held that physical
restraints could be used only when absolutely necessary to prevent injury to the child or to
others-when used for specified periods of time, in a manner that would inflict the least
amount of physical discomfort, when the child is monitored, and written records of when the
restraints were used are kept. They may not be used as a form of punishment, as a convenience
to the correctional officers or in place of programming. The underlying rationale is that
.'[]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action."' Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
86. CHcir CEmETr, supra note 11, 2.01[7], at 2-59 (footnote omitted). "Hogtying" is a
form of restraint m which the child lies on his stomach while his wrists are handcuffed and
his ankles shackled, and the handcuffs and shackles are then bound together.
87. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
88. 322 F Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 328 F Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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status offender, incarcerated as a "Person in Need of Supervision,"8 9 was
confined without notice or a hearing to an isolation cell after fighting with
a matron and another inmate. The six-by-mne foot room was bare except
for a wooden bench, and the only window was blocked, preventing outside
visibility. 9° She remained in isolation for several days, where all she could
do was sit on the bench and stare at the wall. 9 1 The district court ruled
that the extended solitary confinement and the conditions under which it
took place constituted cruel and unusual pumshment. 92 As they have with
the use of physical restraints, subsequent court decisions have required
specific procedures and protections before a juvenile may be placed in
isolation. 93
However, eighth amendment application is not restricted solely to pun-
ishment actually inflicted on the individual but also applies to confinement
"'characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the
conscience of reasonably civilized people."'94 Furthermore, if the right to
treatment is required as a quid pro quo for the state's exercise of parens
patriae,9s any incarceration of juveniles for punitive purposes may well
violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.9
When the state acts as parens patriae, it assumes parental duties that
amount to ordinary proper parental care7 These duties should entail
"immmum acceptable standards of care and treatment for juveniles and the
89. Id. at 475 (Antoinette Lollis was never accused or convicted of a crime. Her mother
was later accused of neglecting her seven brothers and sisters.).
90. Id. at 476.
91. Id.
92. LoIlls, 328 F Supp. at 1118.
93. CHsu CLmNT, supra note 11, 2.01[7], at 2-62 to 2-65.
94. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F Supp. 575, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting Holt v. Sarver,
309 F Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark. 1970)).
95. Id. at 585. The court cites numerous examples in Supreme Court decisions, lower
federal court cases and scholarly works to justify its assertion that such treatment is a
constitutional right. Id. at 598-602. But cf. Santana, 793 F.2d 41 (the court held that there is
no constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment, although it noted that any alternatives
employed must be sufficiently related to the state's legitimate interests and objectives); DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989) (the Court held that when
a state takes an individual into custody and holds him against his will, it is the state's duty
to provide treatment and protection, but the scope and nature of that duty is still subject to
considerable discretion).
-96. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F Supp. 1354, 1366 (D.R.I. 1972).
Because the parens patriae doctrine emphasizes rehabilitation and community readjustment
measures rather than punishment, it seems iromc that "cruel and unusual punishment" would
be an issue with regard to the incarceration of juvenile offenders. It seems logical that if the
state would intervene when parents confine their child indoors, provide no education, recreation
or exercise, allow no visitors and refuse to provide medical treatment, then the state may not
act in a similar manner when fulfilling its parens patriae role. Id. at 1367. It is bitterly iromic
that a child may be incarcerated for truancy and then be denied proper education by institutions
that are incapable or unwilling to provide it. Id. at 1369.
97 Nelson, 491 F.2d at 360.
1014 [Vol. 66:999
INCARCERATING JUVENILES
right to individualized care and treatment." 98 Some courts have ruled that
failure to provide minimum health care, 99 adequate educational programs,'00
minimum regular exercise and recreation' 0' and appropriate or therapeutic
work programs' °2 violates the juvenile offender's constitutional rights. Re-
fusal to adhere to every one of these requirements constitutes a denial of
those rights. However, most guidelines that exist lack specificity, making it
difficult to interpret the courts' expectations. Furthermore, the problem of
enforcing these guidelines is exacerbated by a shortage of policing agencies
to monitor correctional institutions. Thus, even though courts are expanding
the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" to include a wider array
of punitive measures, many juveniles' eighth amendment rights are still
frequently violated.
D. The Statutory Rights of a Juvenile
Federal law and many state statutes require authorities to segregate
juvenile offenders from adult inmates. In particular, Congress enacted the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) °3 in 1974 to
improve the juvenile justice court system by regulating federal funds to the
individual states.
Under the JJDPA, participating states submit a three-year plan to remove
juveniles from adult institutions and provide appropriate alternative programs
that cater to the needs of juveniles.? 4 The JJDPA mandates removal of all
status offenders and nonoffenders from secure detention facilities 05 and
requires that delinquent youths "shall not be detained or confined in any
institution in which they have regular contact with adult persons incarcerated
because they have been convicted of a crime or are awaiting trial on criminal
charges."' 6 Although the latter provision does not demand complete seg-
regation from adult inmates, it does require that there be "no more than
haphazard or accidental contact."107
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. Camir CLmNT, supra note 11, 2.01[2], at 2-13 to 2-14.
100. Id., 2.01[4], at 2-35.
I01. Id., 2.0114], at 2-37.
102. See id., 2.0114], at 2-39.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5777 (1982). For an historical overview of the JJDPA, see Raley &
Dean, The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: Federal Leadership in State
Reform, 8 LAw & PoL'Y 397 (1986).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (1982).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(13).
107. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(d)(i) (1989). Likewise, the State of Indiana does not prohibit
incarceration of juveniles in adult facilities, although it allows only incidental contact between
juvenile and adult inmates. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-6.5(d) (Supp. 1990).
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The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act'01 and almost every state code also
require separation of juveniles from adult prisoners in detention facilities. °9
So do the primary professional standards promulgated by such groups as
the Institute of Judicial Adimnstration/Amencan Bar Association, the
American Correctional Association, the National Advisory Committee for
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency 110 Furthermore, the courts have held that unless
there is a legitimate governmental purpose for holding pretrial detainees,
such detention violates the fundamental fairness doctrine of due process.",
Courts also have condemned juvenile incarceration in facilities where there
is opportunity for contact between juvenile and adult inmates." 2
The significant drop in the number of juveniles incarcerated in adult
facilities since the JJDPA's inception attests to the success of the program."'
Nonetheless, a considerable number of violations, continue to plague the
system, thus warranting increased supervision and strict enforcement. For
example, states may continue to receive federal funding if they submit a
plan that demonstrates a consistent attempt to assign at least seventy-five
percent of the grant to develop programs designed to prevent juvenile
delinquency, remove juveniles from adult institutions and form alternative
community-based facilities in place of secure detention centers." 4 Meanwhile,
violations of the JJDPA prohibition against incarceration of children with
108. 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1988).
109. CHLD CLIENT, supra note 11, 2.0111], at 2-5.
110. Id., 2.01[l], at 2-6 n.14.
111. In Schall, 467 U.S. 253, the Court held that the preventive detention of a juvenile is
compatible with the fundamental fairness doctnne required by due process only when it serves
a legitimate state objective and there are adequate procedural safeguards. However, this
practice does not justify restrictions and conditions of confinement constituting punishment.
Id. at 269. Determining whether constitutional rights have been violated depends on the
balancing of liberty interests against relevant state interests. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (reason-
able physical restraints used on a mentally retarded person for the protection of himself and
other residents of the institution may override his liberty interests when professional judgment
deems the use of such restraints as necessary); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (absent a
showing of intent to punish, the restrictions of pretrial detention do not violate the detainee's
liberty interest if that detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose-
in this case, insuring the detainee's presence at trial and maintaining effective management of
the facility). For a general discussion outlining the problems with pretrial detention, see Note,
supra note 50.
112. CHLD CLIENT, supra note 11, 2.01[l], at 2-5.
113. According to the 1986 compliance report, the number of status offenders and nonof-
fenders in adult jails decreased 96.5% over a seven-year period, and the number of juveniles
in adult jails decreased 64.7% over the previous three to six years. Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Amendments of 1988, H.R. 605, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1988)
[hereinafter JJDP Amendments].
114. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(10). However, the 1988 amendments to the JJDPA allow the
administrator to base his assessment and determination of a state's "substantial compliance"
with the Act's requirement by reviewing four criteria, one of which is review of the state's
"meaningful progress in removing other juveniles from jails and lockups for adults." JJDP
Amendments, supra note 113, at 11.
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adults may continue during the three-year time limitation, and states may
remain in violation even when that funding is withheld." 5
Perhaps most importantly, the JJDPA does not require authorities to
separate status offenders, nonoffenders or juveniles convicted of minor
crimes from violent, hard-core juvenile offenders. Such segregation is jus-
tified for reasons similar to those that justify segregating juveniles from
inmates: Even if juveniles were held in separate facilities from adults, it
would defeat the purpose of that separation if status and nonoffenders still
were exposed to juveniles whose criminal behavior resembled that of their
adult counterparts.
Model rules and ethical codes provide numerous criteria regarding the
care and treatment of juveniles, but unfortunately, they are merely suggested
guidelines and are treated accordingly. Court decisions, while given more
authority, tend to be vague. In both cases, decision makers often interpret
these guidelines in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
E. The Recovery Rights of a Juvenile
Within the past ten years, the juvenile justice system has witnessed a
number of changes in the enforcement of juvenile rights, including the
imposition of liability on those who violate juvenile rights and an expansion
of the remedies available to victims. For instance, under the JJDPA, a state
that fails to adhere to the Act's requirements may lose its federal funding
unless the state can commit to achieving full compliance within a three-year
period." 6 In addition, while the JJDPA does not specifically allow civil
actions by individuals, a 1979 Supreme Court interpretation of a similar
funding statute to allow such actions implies that this may be a possibility
under the JJDPA.117
Recent case law also has enabled juveniles to bring a private cause of
action for enforcemen-t of their rights. For example, in 1988, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed a claim brought by a class of
115. For example, Indiana's 1989 funding was withheld for failure to adhere to the provisions
of the JJDPA, particularly removal of juvenile offenders from adult correctional institutions.
Bercovitz, Juveniles in Indiana's Jails, REs GEsTAE, Aug. 1989, at 58-59. See generally State
Under Fire to Remove Juveniles from Jail, Indianapolis Star, Feb. 5, 1989, at I, col. 1.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(c). In accordance with the JJDPA amendments of 1988, the admin-
istrator may now, at his discretion, waive termination of a noncomplying state's eligibility on
the condition that the state applies all of its federal funding to the removal of juveniles from
its jails. JJDP Amendments, supra note 113, at 11.
117. Soler, Dale & Flake, supra note 42, at 12-15. The authors compare the JJDPA to Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, under which the Supreme Court granted a private
civil remedy when certain conditions were satisfied. See Cannon v. Umversity of Clucago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979) (the Court granted the plaintiff the right to bring a private lawsuit under Title
IX against two medical schools, which had allegedly demed her admission based on her sex,
because she had satisfied four factors set out by the Court to allow such actions).
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juveniles for violation of their rights under the JJDPA and section 1983
seeking declaratory, compensatory and equitable relief;"' in 1989, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a section 1983 cause of action
brought against a prison official by the estate of an incarcerated juvenile
who committed suicide was appropriate;11 9 and in 1990, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit imposed section 1983 damages against state social
workers for failing to provide proper treatment and care to a juvenile under
their care.' ° Claims under section 1983 are becomng particularly attractive
due to extensive federal case law involving civil rights litigation dealing with
conditions of confinement in mental hospitals and prison facilities.'12  A
further attraction is the possibility of recovering attorney's fees and expenses
under section 1988.1
There is some difficulty in imposing liability on federal, state and county
officials. By tradition, judicial officers are granted absolute immunity,
allowing them to be "free to act upon [their] own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to [themselves]."'123 Furthermore, all
jail personnel who follow judicial orders are likewise shielded from liabil-
ity,12 unless it can be clearly established that the alleged misconduct amounted
118. Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1988).
119. Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271 (1ith Cir. 1989) (the court held that the jail officials'
behavior did not constitute "deliberate indifference" to the juvenile's safety from self-harm,
thus entitling the officials to immunity).
120. K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
121. See C= CuEN-r, supra note 11, 1.01, at 1-2.
122. Id., 2.0318], at 2-89. "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, the Court, m its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see, e.g., Hendrickson v. Branstad, 740 F Supp. 636 (N.D. Iowa
1990) (subsequent action to Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1988) in which
the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a 90% recovery of attorney's fees from the
state defendants, because the plaintiffs were "catalysts" in forcing the state into compliance
with JJDPA); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir.
1985) (the court ordered reimbursement of attorney's fees to institutionalized juveniles who
alleged their constitutional rights to procedural safeguards had been violated, because parents
and guardians could have them admitted to mental health facilities without the juveniles'
consent).
The purpose of § 1988 is to provide a federal remedy when current federal law is inadequate
by incorporating the law of the state in which the federal court is located into federal law.
This allows individuals access to federal courts when their civil rights are recognized by state
law but not federal law. Soler, Dale & Flake, supra note 42, at 29. For a general overview
regarding the collection of attorney's fees, see tmw CUaNT, supra note 11, 2.03[8], at 2-
89 to 2-101.
123. McFaul, 599 F Supp. at 1430 (citations omitted). Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
reh'g dented, 436 U.S. 951 (1978), provides an example of the breadth given to judicial
immunity. In that case, the Court refused to impose liability on a judge who ordered the
sterilization of a fifteen-year-old girl without granting- notice, a hearing or representation of
her interests by counsel.
124. McFaul, 599 F Supp. at 1431.
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to "deliberate indifference" to the claimant's constitutional rights.'"
Though state officials are shielded from liability by the eleventh amend-
ment, 6 the amendment only bars money awards paid from the state
treasury. 2 7 Therefore, judgments in lawsuits naming a public official in his
individual capacity will not be constitutionally barred, because it must be
paid by the individual himself.28 Immunity also does not extend to lawsuits
for declaratory and injunctive relief.129 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
held that punitive damages may, be recovered in civil rights actions when
public officials exhibited "callous or reckless indifference" to the rights and
safety of others. 30
Reaching elected officials may be even more difficult. Because county
officials do not exercise direct authority over incarcerated juveniles, proxi-
mate cause may be established only if the juvenile's injuries were a fore-
seeable result of failure to provide adequate detention facilities.' Though
establishing a negligence claim may be more difficult, the courts have
imposed liability on county commissioners as members of the county's
governing board.3 2
125. Id. at 1435; Edwards, 867 F.2d 1271 (the court held that the jail official's behavior
did not constitute "deliberate indifference" to the juvenile's safety from self-harm, since the
juvenile's request to see a psycluatrist was not unusual, and he had not previously shown any
indication of suicide). While forfeiture of judicial immunity is possible in cases of "clear abuse
of all junsdiction over the subject-matter," McFaul, 599 F Supp. at 1431, such cases are
construed narrowly. See Edwards, 867 F.2d at 1277; McFau, 599 F Supp. at 1435. However,
when judges, legislators and prosecutors act outside of their official capacity, they are granted
only qualified or "good faith" immunity rather than absolute immunity. Soler, Dale & Flake,
supra note 42, at 35. Official immunity is less encompassing than judicial immunity and
requires that the actions being examined were within the sphere of the individual's authority
and were performed in good faith. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1970).
Thus, for example, judges have been held liable for participating in hearings after being
disqualified, assaulting an individual in the courtroom and perforrmng legislative and executive
(instead of judicial) duties. Soler, Dale & Flake, supra note 42, at 35.
126. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI; see
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
127. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (the Court held that the eleventh
amendment barred the retroactive payment of benefits that were wrongfully withheld by a
"nonconsenting" state), reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974).
128. Soler, Dale & Flake, supra note 42, at 40.
129. Id. at 34.
130. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). The Smith standard was applied in Stokes v.
Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the jury awarded $70,000 in compensatory
damages against a sheriff and deputy, $105,000 in punitive damages against the deputy and
$205,000 in punitive damages agamst the sheriff for ignoring the plaintiff's cries for help while
he was repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted by his celmates.
131. Smith, 461 U.S. at 32.
132. Gremer v. Kennebec County, 748 F Supp. 908 (D. Me. 1990) (comnussioners held
liable because their responsibilities included administration and maintenance of county jail);
see CHiD CLrENr, supra note 11, 2.03[5], at 2-79.
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Finally, in Monell v Department of Social Services,'33 the Supreme Court
rejected a municipality's assertion of absolute immunity, thus exposing all
local governmental entities to civil rights actions for money damages and
declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court specified that a municipality
could incur liability only for its own harmful policy, practice or custom;
municipalities may not be held liable for their employees' actions under the
respondeat superior 134 doctrine.'35 While Monell left untouched the issue of
qualified immunity as an alternative defense to a section 1983 action, the
Court held in a subsequent decision that a municipality could not assert the
good faith of its officers or agents as a defense, thereby revoking any
immunity to a section 1983 action for damages resulting from constitutional
violations.' 36 However, this decision does not affect the status of states,
which the Court still refuses to include in its interpretation of "person"
within the meaning of section 1983.'17 Thus, even when a juvenile's rights
are violated, the officials whose actions led to those violations may not
necessarily be reached for damages.
III. CURRENT REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Despite the nature and extent of the problems facing juvenile justice
departments, reformers have managed to implement a variety of programs
to reduce the system's inadequacies. Yet, due to common restraints such as
lack of funding, inadequate supervision and organization, and deficient
enforcement measures, these programs still fall short of parenspatriae goals.
Thus, while such efforts are laudable, they do not compensate for the fact
that many juveniles in correctional facilities continue to be mistreated by
the state.
Since its inception, the JJDPA has played a major tole in reducing the
number of juveniles in secure confinement. By 1989, fifty-one states and
territories had complied with JJDPA provisions mandating deinstitutional-
ization of status offenders (DSO) 38 since passage of the Act in 1974.139 The
133. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
134. From the Latin meaning "let the master answer," the theory of respondeat supenor
projects liability on one entity for the harm done by its employee. BLACK'S LAW DicTIoNARY
1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
135. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
136. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
137 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). The Court's ruling in Will
did not contradict its earlier holding in Monell, since the eleventh amendment's protection
extends to states but not municipalities.
138. Speirs, Assessing the Effects of the Denstitutionalization of Status Offenders, OJJDP
UPDATE ON REsEARCH, Jan. 1989, at 1.
139. Id. Note that compliance by the states is voluntary and thus may be revoked at any
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Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)140 has
conducted numerous studies to examine, alter and monitor specific programs
and services that have emerged as a result of DSO.141 Recently it awarded
a research grant for a three-year project to analyze state legislation con-
cerning DSO and the effects that DSO has had on juveniles, the juvenile
justice system and the public. 42 However, on November 18, 1988, Congress
passed new amendments as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 which
cut back discretionary funds and increased formula grant funds.143 As a
result, the OJJDP has been forced to reduce funding for continuation
programs and cannot finance new programs beyond those mandated by the
new amendments. 44
As an alternative to juvenile detention facilities, both residential and
nonresidential diversion programs have gained popularity as a means of
effectively providing dependency recovery services, individual and family
counseling, crisis intervention, dispute mediation, and vocational and edu-
cational training. 4 Likewise, probation officers, assigned to troubled youths
for supervision and counseling, may become role models and confidantes
in a manner similar to the Big Brother/Big Sister program philosophy as
each relationship matures.'"
Inevitably, critics have identified problems with the expanding use of
diversion programs in lieu of secure detention. For example, net-widemng
is said to occur when the creation of programs results in more control over
juveniles who might otherwise be handled less intrusively (if not completely
ignored and returned to their parents). 47 Yet, the opportunity to help
troubled children by granting access to programs and services that can
provide needed treatment would seem to legitimate their increased use. This
140. The OJJDP is an agency of the Department of Justice which monitors the JJDPA.
141. Speirs, supra note 138.
142. Id. The agency awarded the grant to the Social Science Research Institute of the
Umversity of Southern Califorrna in Los Angeles.
143. Munson, OJJDP Fiscal Year 1989 Program Plan, OJJDP UPDATE ON PROGRAMS, May
1989, at 1.
144. Id. at 2. Of the seven programs instituted in fiscal year 1989, four focus on the research
and development of strategies aimed at prevention, diversion and reintegration programs for
juveniles. These four studies are: (1) the Research Program on Juveniles Taken into Custody
(data analysis of the type of juvenile taken into custody and statistics on the number of
juvenile deaths while in custody); (2) Minority Youth in the Juvenile Justice System (study on
the disproportionality of minority juveniles confined in secure detention facilities and suggested
strategies for treatment and community readjustment); (3) the Study to Evaluate Conditions
in Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities (research program to determine whether
facilities meet national standards); and (4) Nonparticipating States Initiative (providing resources
to those states which do not participate in the JJDPA to separate juveniles from adults in
institutions and remove status offenders from secure detention facilities). Id. at 2-3.
145. C. SmnEMAN & F REAMER, REABIITATiNG Juvi E JusTicE 132 (1986).
146. A. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 132-33.
147. Id. at 183; C. SmPA.Nr & F REAMER, supra note 145, at 134.
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is especially true for juveniles who instead would be sent back to their
onginal environments without receiving any care.
The process of relabeling, that is, reclassifying a juvenile in order to
qualify him for a service otherwise restncted, is also criticized. 14 For
juveniles who do not fit the clear-cut stereotype of a particular category,
there is no question that problems of relabeling will continue to arise for
those who fall in the gray area. Tins problem may be alleviated by narrowly
defined standards and reference to the documented success of certain
programs used for similarly situated juveniles. In any event, it is imperative
that the juvenile courts err on the side of rehabilitation rather than detention.
Despite the objections, "'properly implemented ' " 49 diversion programs
have proven quite successful; studies indicate that they reduce stigma and
coerciveness often associated with the justice system, place greater emphasis
on juveniles' needs, decrease recidivism and cost less than juvenile court
processing.150 Overall, they remain a viable and refreshing alternative to
juvenile incarceration.
Institutions operated by private individuals rather than mumcipal em-
ployees also have grown in number and popularity Relying on the parens
patriae philosophy of rehabilitation and treatment, wilderness programs
such as Outward Bound and VisionQuest use "adventure" and the "physical
challenges of the outdoors" to teach personal responsibility and commitment
to both first time offenders and hard-core delinquents.'' Juvenile participants
learn to interact as a group; the physical and emotional challenges strengthen
the individual's self-esteem and confidence as well as teach the importance
of cooperation to survive in the outdoors. 52 These programs boast successful
results, 5 3 and the cost (about $30,000 per child annually)154 makes them an
148. C. SHn mAN & F REA.NAR, supra note 145, at 134. For example, a neglected child
may be reclassified as a "person m need of supervision" to be eligible for a particular program.
While this may not appear to be a problem, the dilemma arises when a juvenile charged with
a delinquency offense is "relabeled" to satisfy the intake criteria of a specific detention center.
Id.
149. A. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 186, 192 (citing Osgood & Weichselbaum, Juvenile
Diversion: When Practice Matches Theory, 21 J. REs. Qus & DELNQ. 33-56 (1984)).
150. Id. at 186-87.
151. See generally Scott, Wilderness Programs Rehabilitate Juvenile Delinquents, in 2
SoURCES iN CRInMNAL JusTicE (OPPOsNG VIEwpoNTs) 267 (1987); Gavzer, Wilderness Camps
Challenge Delinquents, in 2 SouRcEs N CRnuNAL JusTIcE (OPPosING VIEwPoINTs) 275 (1987).
However, most camps refuse to admit juveniles who have committed violent offenses and
instead limit participation to status offenders, substance abuse offenders and other less serious
delinquency offenders. A. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 197-98. For an overview of the more
prominent wilderness programs, see id. at 198-216.
152. A. RoBERTs, supra note 43, at 195.
153. "More than 3000 boys and girls have gone through VisionQuest, and [founder] Bob
Burton says only about a third return to institutions. With more traditional youth programs,





attractive alternative to state facilities for which taxpayers pay approximately
$27,000 per child annually."5 However, it is debatable whether the stringent
discipline associated with such programs is appropriate for status offenders
and nonoffenders. 116 Furthermore, there have been allegations of abuse and
neglect at some camps; 57 some critics claim the camps are ineffective and
allege the use of inhumane, cult-like confrontational methods to humiliate
the participants.118 Nonetheless, studies of the effectiveness of wilderness
programs have generally found them to be a preferable alternative to
institutional care; they tend to be more humane, less costly and more
successful in reducing recidivism. 59
Some courts have ordered restitution m the form of either monetary
compensation or unpaid community service as pumshment for juvenile
delinquency.'6 Monetary compensation is usually tailored to fit the juvenile's
ability to pay; the court may appoint a mediator to draw up an acceptable
repayment plan or send the juvenile to court-established programs which
provide traimng and job placement.' 6' Juveniles who are ordered to perform
community service restitution must work for a specified number of hours
at a private nonprofit or governmental organization under the direction of
a particular supervisor. 62 The use of restitution has become increasingly
popular with juvenile courts. On a national level, the courts have received
seventy-six percent of ordered repayment, and recidivism has markedly
declined.16
Lawmakers also have tried to curb juvenile delinquency by holding parents
accountable for the actions of their children. Some states have enacted
legislation subjecting parents to jail terms or monetary fines for contributing
to the delinquency of their son or daughter. 64 Legal scholars justify this
155. Allen-Hagen, Children in Custody, Juv. JUST. BuLL., Oct. 1988, at 1.
156. While it is generally true that youths involved m these programs are mainly hard-core
offenders, there is proof that nonviolent offenders have been participants as well. Hurst,
Wilderness Camps Abuse Delinquents, in 2 Soucs IN CiE.mL JusTICE (OPPosnIo VImw-
POINTs) 277, 279 (1987); see A. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 204.
157. Hurst, supra note 156, at 279. Note that because these camps are pnvately-run, their
activities are not prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, in order to seek relief, juveniles must
rely on tort remedies.
158. Id. at 277-80.
159. A. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 213-16.
160. Id. at 134.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 134-35.
164. Kantrowitz, Now, Parents on Trial, NEwswimr, Oct. 2, 1989, at 54. Florida recently
passed a bill that allows judges to impose a five-year prison term and a $5,000 fine on parents
if a child uses a gun that is lying around the house. An Indiana couple was ordered to pay
$30,341 to the state as reimbursement for the incarceration and treatment of their son in a
juvenile detention home, because his delinquency was a direct result of their drug and alcohol
abuse and marital discord. Id. By statute, an Indiana judge may assess costs of the child's
expenses to his parents if they are financially able to make reimbursements to the state. IND.
CODE § 31-6-4-18 (1991).
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movement toward increased parental accountability as "a logical evolution
in the historical relationship between the family and the courts. Tradition-
ally, parents have had the nght to raise their children pretty much as they
pleased . . [T]hat right also means that parents may be held legally
responsible if their child-rearing decisions hurt others."' 165
Placing criminal sanctions on parents of juvenile offenders is a relatively
new concept, thus making it difficult to measure its success. Nonetheless,
critics have raised valid arguments in opposition to the practice: it may
violate constitutional rights to punish one individual for the actions of
another; 1' statistics on minors arrested in 1989 indicate that they often are
from lower-income families who are financially unable to pay fines;167 and
it may be that only well-educated parents will increase supervision and
control over their child in response to such laws. 68 Considering these
criticisms, it is doubtful that this movement will become standard legal
practice, much less succeed as an effective deterrent to juvenile crime.
It is not uncommon for research results and program evaluations to
disagree, thus increasing the difficulty of determining which alternatives to
secure detention are the most effective for juveniles. 69 While some programs
have demonstrated a measured amount of success for certain juveniles under
specific circumstances, no one program has proven effective for all juveniles
under all circumstances, due pnmarily to the inability to predict which
programs would be best suited for which juveniles. 70 What is certain,
however, is that institutional care fails to provide an environment conducive
to actual treatment. Acts of physical and sexual violence and exploitation
by prison staff and members, contributing to an already existing sense of
fear and isolation, can hardly be considered an environment in which parens
patriae principles can be properly implemented. '7' These problems associated
with institutional care lead to the conclusion that diversion programs are
considerably more successful at accomplishing the treatment and rehabili-
tation goals that secure detention cannot.
IV. STATE CONTROL OF A NATIONAL PROBLEM
By virtue of their juvenile status, children are denied many legal nghts
in return for the state's parens patrtae protection. However, the juvenile
justice system does not live up to its promises: juveniles are asked to forfeit
165. Kantrowitz, supra note 164, at 54.
166. Id. at 55.
167. Id. at 54.
168. Id. at 55.
169. C. SmRsmAN & F REAmER, supra note 145, at 99-100.




their legal rights in return for rehabilitative treatment and care rather than
punishment, but they do not always receive that treatment or care. Mean-
while, the irony of the situation is compoundea by the fact that those most
in need of protection are deprived of it by the entity that has a duty to
provide for them.172 Of those rights that are acknowledged, many are either
ignored or blatantly violated.
A. The Need for a Uniform Code
Rehabilitation and treatment may be administered by several means. The
first is through the JJDPA which stands as a useful model for the states
to follow in developing and maintaimng a separate juvenile system. Unfor-
tunately, its downfall lies in its lack of authoritative power, since states
comply with JJDPA provisions on a voluntary basis and the only penalizing
force available is monetary. Similarly, the guidelines promulgated by pro-
fessional standards committees and legal organizations offer valuable insight
for establishing a functional and appropriate juvenile system, but because
they do not, have any binding authority on the states, they are usually
regarded as recommendations. 73 Finally, while court decisions provide more
concrete sources of authority, problems arise whenever courts are forced to
act as the sole enforcer. Courts, as a general rule, are not effective policing
forces, because aggneved parties, rather than courts, initiate redress. Fur-
thermore, courts are constrained by the Constitution to adjudicate concrete
cases.1 74
One of juvenile law's most pressing problems is the lack of an authori-
tative body with the power of enforcement. Although the OJJDP has proven
an effective advocate of juvenile rights, it does not have the influence
necessary to compel compliance from the states. Therefore, paying heed to
federalism concerns, the authority and responsibility for formulating stan-
dards and fulfilling obligations for the care and protection of juveniles must
lie with the states themselves. To do so, the states must re-examine their
own juvenile systems and identify the funds available to stimulate reform,
establish strict positive standards to avoid past problems and facilitate
reform, and create state watchdog agencies to ensure compliance with these
standards and monitor the systems' progress.
To guarantee effective operation of the states' systems, it is imperative
that a model juvenile code be created to establish specific standards and
procedures which the juvenile courts then must follow In general, state
bureaucracies tend to follow the path of least resistance when left without
172. But cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 1001 (1989).
173. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
174. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cI. I.
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proper guidance. Providing a comprehensive set of standards ensures un-
form application of the law, thereby promoting fairness, efficiency and
predictability for consequences of similar conduct. 75
B. The Need for a New Juvenile Justice System
To effectuate the concepts and pnnciples of the parens patriae doctrine,
the juvenile justice system must be completely revamped, including the
process of intervention, court roles and procedures, treatment and
rehabilitation, and the administration of the system. 76 In addition to tra-
ditional concerns, contemporary problems must be addressed by the states'
systems to comply with current societal demands and realities. For example,
it is vital that states enact legislation requiring that a juvenile's status be
determined at the preliminary hearing to segregate chronic, hard-core ju-
venile offenders from nonviolent delinquents, status offenders and nonof-
fenders. 7 7 While all juveniles are entitled to the same rehabilitation and
treatment rights, it is useless to advocate the separation of juvenile offenders
175. The development of the Miranda rule may serve as a parallel example of the adoption
of a concrete set of rules used to guarantee that specific procedural safeguards would be
applied consistently to similar cases. Before 1966, the Supreme Court applied various tests to
determine whether an accused person was adequately informed of his right to silence. After
years of engaging in case-by-case analyses, which provided few general standards to guide
police and the lower courts, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established
explicit rules to ensure that the defendant's fifth amendment nght against self-incrimination
would be protected. See generally Lippman, Miranda v. Arizona: Twenty Years Later, 9 Cans.
JUST. J. 241 (1987).
Massachusetts has developed an objective classification system based on levels of risk,
treatment and control to produce a structured hierarchy of sanctions and programs for juvenile
offenders. Although the program is still far from perfect, it remains a viable and sensible
alternative. Guanno-Ghezzi & Byrne, Developing a Model of Structured Decision Making in
Juvenile Corrections: The Massachusetts Experience, 35 CRIME & DEawQ. 270 (1989).
The success of the Uniform Commercial Code lends further support to the concept of model
rules. The drafting and implementation of the U.C.C. served to maintain consistency and
coordination by its orderly arrangement of rules and open-ended pnnciples that allowed courts
interpretive leeway. See Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code,
29 WM. & MARY L. REy 341 (1988). The U.C.C. also provides a thorough, updated source
of present commercial law, and simplifies the law by explaimng the purpose, policy and reason
for each code section. Id. at 371-74. Interestingly, codification of existing law into the U.C.C.
was initially met with staunch opposition: .'A code is intended to replace the earlier common
law. How can one ensure that the judges, brought up on the common law and familiar with
it, will wipe out their knowledge of the cases from their memories and concentrate on the
statutory words?' Id. at 345-46 n.25 (quoting Diamond, Codification of the Law of Contract,
31 MOD. L. REy 361, 375-76 (1968)).
176. For example, requiring a judge to justify the sanctions imposed on the juvenile offender,
adopt the "least restrictive alternative," base her decision on established criteria, cite the
grounds and reasons for which particular sanctions were imposed rather than a less restrictive
one, and inquire into rehabilitative services available to the juvenile offender will allow for
some judicial discretion without the temptation and ability to abuse it. C. SmanMAN & F
REAMER, supra note 145, at 119.
177. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
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from adult inmates when juvenile status offenders or nonoffenders will be
similarly harmed by incarceration with those juveniles who are similar to
adult convicts.
Moreover, deinstitutionalization may be self-defeating without divesti-
ture-that is, removing status offenders and nonoffenders from the juris-
diction of the courts. Some researchers have called for the complete
decriminalization of status offenses as a natural extension of the JJDPA's
philosophy regarding the incarceration of youths for behavior that is essen-
tially noncriminal as unjust.17 8 Neither demstitutionalization nor decrimi-
nalization, however, can be successfully pursued unless it is connected with
a divestiture plan. If the courts are unable to hold juveniles against their
will, they lose their stronghold positions, because they have no other way
of forcing a defiant child to cooperate. 179 Although removal from the court's
jurisdiction would mean reliance on public and private channels to control
delinquent behavior, these organizations are readily available.1i0 Further-
more, returmng cases to community-run shelters may be a more appropriate
response, since most of the offenses stem from problems with the family
and school, not with the legal system.
Legislators need to consider alternatives to secure detention facilities.
Many juveniles get into trouble with the law because of their educational,
familial, cultural and economic environments. Failed diversionary tactics
and high recidivism may be due to the practice of sending the "rehabilitated"
child back to the very environment that caused his initial downfall. Thus,
short-term programs such as Outward Bound may serve only as a temporary
escape. Instead, shelter centers or longer-term residential facilities may be
preferable to these programs, because they are better able to provide
rehabilitative treatment within a nurturing environment and can easily be
funded with the money allocated to hold juveniles in secure detention centers
every year. 8 ' Juveniles would receive the care and treatment mandated by
178. Logan & Rausch, Why Deinstitutionalizing Status Offenders is Pointless, 31 Ciwm &
DEuNQ. 501, 502 (1985). Indeed, the idea of decriminalizing status offenders dates as far back
as 1966 with the Commssion on Law Enforcement and the Adnumstration of Justice,
established by President Lyndon Johnson. Raley & Dean, The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act: Federal Leadership in State Reform, 8 LAw & POL'Y 397, 399 (1986). Although
the JJDPA, enacted in 1974 and amended subsequently, embraced many of the recommen-
dations of the Comnussion, it failed to address the decriminalization issue. Id. at 402.
179. Logan & Rausch, supra note 178, at 512-13.
180. Id. at 513; see also supra text accompanying notes 138-55.
181. A study conducted by the American Justice Institute estimated that incarceration in
secure detention with full services averages $61 per day per child compared to alternatives
such as attention homes ($17) and small group homes ($17). OSFICE or JuvENHE JUsTIcE AND
DELINQ ENCY P w moN, JuvENmLEs IN ADULT JAms AND LOCKuPs 7 (Feb. 1985). But cf. C.
Sim~mm & F R.mER, supra note 145, at 139-42 (some alternative programs may be as
costly, if not more, than secure detention due to problems of net-widening, longer periods of
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the parens patriae doctrine without states spending exorbitant amounts of
time, money and energy only to see it wasted on another recidivism statistic.
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this problem is that several
organizations already have undertaken the laborious task of conducting
studies and analyzing data-to formulate a set of standards that addresses
the rights and obligations of juveniles. For instance, the Institute of Judicial
Admimstration/Amencan Bar Association established the Juvenile Justice
Standards Project to design a new juvenile justice system. More than two
hundred juvenile justice experts participated in the project, ranging from
distinguished lawyers and judges to specialists in related fields of psychology,
education, social work, psychiatry, sociology, law enforcement and health
care.8 2 The result of their efforts is contained in a twenty-three volume set
of standards and commentary" 3 completed in 1977 184
Nonetheless, implementation of the proposed standards has been excru-
ciatingly slow. Although the ABA House of Delegates has adopted them,
restricted funding has prevented widespread publication, and, as active
interest and participation in the field of juvenile justice is relatively new,
its priority status has given way to concerns deemed more serious or
immediate. Furthermore, the usual resistance to change is only exacerbated
by the demands of reformers for a total overhaul of the system. It is
reasonable to anticipate that drastic revision of the system could change
jobs, challenge existing agency practices and curtail the level of discretion
given to correctional authorities. In short, many participants in the system
may feel threatened by change and may be reluctant to adopt it.1 5
Reformers of the 1990s demand virtually the same changes sought by
those in the 1970s. The Juvenile Justice Standards Project, and similar
organizations which report recommendations for standards, have proposed
an entirely revised system which they believe would recognize the rights of
the juvenile, protect the concerns of the community and provide safeguards
to ensure an equitable balance among the genuine interests of juveniles,
families and the state. In addition, the federal government may offer
incentives to comply with these regulations by providing funding to alleviate
some of the costs of implementing the program. This proposition would be
particularly attractive considering that states that refused to comply could
supervision, more expensive services and increased costs covered by the general community).
In a comparison of the effectiveness of the juvenile justice system in four separate jurisdic-
tions (Florida, New York, Washington and Massachusetts), it was apparent that states focusing
on treatment-oriented measures experienced the biggest drop in juvenile crime; their statistics
proved to be inversely proportionate to the response rate of states who were more punishment-
oriented. See generally Bernard & Katkin, Introduction, 8 LAW & POL'Y 392 (1986).
182. B. FLICKER, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SummARY AND ANALYSIS 17 (1977).
183. Id. at 19.
184. Id. at 258.
185. Id. at 266.
1028 [Vol. 66:999
INCARCERATING JUVENILES
still be held liable for violating juveniles' constitutional rights and be forced
to implement most of the regulations anyway, but at their own expense. In
any case, until federal and state governments commit to making such broad-
based changes, the juvenile justice system will continue to exist as an
ineffectual means of providing treatment and rehabilitative care to youths
who have been neglected, abandoned or detained for status offenses.
CONCLUSION
The past fifteen years have witnessed an increase in constitutional and
civil rights litigation seeking the protection, treatment and rehabilitation of
juveniles as mandated by the parens patriae doctrine. As a result, federal
and state statutes require mandatory segregation of juveniles from adult
inmates, prohibition of secure detention for status offenders and nonoffen-
ders, safe and sanitary conditions of confinement, adequate medical and
psychological care, educational, recreational and exercise programs, and
increased training and supervision of employees. Legal challenges over the
use of physical restraints and isolation practices have allowed the courts to
broadly construe their definition of corporal punishment, restricting a wide
range of punitive measures. Reform movements have contributed to the
establishment of regulatory agencies responsible for developing, maintaining
and enforcing programs that cater to the needs of the juvenile offender.
Private institutions have developed alternative approaches to the treatment
and deterrence of delinquents through alternative homes and wilderness
programs. Increased liability and recovery measures have provided juveniles
with more adequate forms of compensation.
These advancements may be hailed as a victory in the fight for acknowl-
edgement of juvenile rights. Yet, to revive the parens patrtae doctrine, it is
imperative that legislators and reformers focus on its original purpose while
considering the changes in today's society Establishing a model juvenile
code (which the states must adopt) could reduce, if not eliminate, the
disparate and indiscriminate treatment of juvenile offenders. Shelters and
other community-run home programs have already proven to be inexpensive
and immensely successful alternatives to incarceration. Finally, the decrim-
inalization of status offenses would alleviate problems of inadvertently
placing status offenders in jail, and divestiture would further encourage the
use of alternative home programs for both status offenders and nonoffen-
ders.
Numerous studies and literature call for the demstitutionalization of
juveniles from adult detention facilities. The burden is now on lawmakers
and law enforcers to do their part, by making a full faith effort to improve
the current system.
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